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Abstract
It is difficult to eliminate all market power in electricity markets and it is therefore fre-
quently suggested that some market power should be tolerated: extra revenues contribute
to fixed cost recovery, facilitate investment, and increase security of supply. This suggestion
implicitly assumes all generation technologies benefit equally from market power. We assess
a mixture of conventional and intermittent generation, e.g. coal plants and wind power. If
all output is sold in the spot market, then intermittent generation benefits less from market
power than conventional generation. Forward contracts or option contracts reduce the level
of market power but the bias against intermittent generators persists.
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1 Introduction
Renewable energy technologies are playing an increasingly important role in the portfolio mix of
electricity generation. However, the intermittent nature of output from wind turbines and solar
panels is frequently discussed as a potential obstacle to larger scale application of these tech-
nologies. Contributions of 10-20% of electrical energy from individual intermittent technologies
create little technical difficulties and additional system costs. With greater contributions from
intermittent technologies, stress to the electricity system could arise during periods when low
output from intermittent generation coincide with high electricity demand. Old power stations
would need to be retained or low capital cost new power stations built to provide electricity for
these periods. Prices during these periods would be high because of high marginal costs of such
generation or the scarcity value of generation capacity. Intermittent generation with high market
shares would not benefit from these high price periods as they occur precisely when intermittent
output is low. The average price received by intermittent generation is therefore lower than
the average price received by the remaining technologies. This intermittency discount is not
a market failure but simply reflects the value of electricity provided by different technologies.
Building on this base case the paper assesses the impact of monopolist and strategic behaviour
of conventional generation companies on the revenues for intermittent generation.
Market power of generation companies in wholesale electricity markets can easily arise be-
cause of low demand elasticity, regional separation of markets due to transmission constraints
and extremely high costs to store electricity (Schmalensee and Golub 1984). Regulators and
competition authorities are concerned by the presence of excessive exercise of market power but
have difficulty in monitoring and mitigating price deviations below 10-20% over marginal cost.
While the level of market power is frequently argued to be significant (Borenstein, Bushnel and
Wolak 2002), these deviations are increasingly accepted, particularly as they might result in
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additional incentives to invest in generation capacity - a major concern of policy makers.
This paper looks in more detail at the implication of market power in short-term markets
where there is intermittent output by fringe generators. For this paper we will assume that these
intermittent fringe generators are wind turbines. In a Cournot model the exercise of market
power by conventional (thermal) generation companies is increasing with the demand for their
output. That implies that market power exercise is high when wind output is low and low when
wind output is high. Wind generators therefore benefit less from the exercise of market power
than conventional generators. Frequently supply function models are used to represent strategic
behaviour in electricity spot markets. They predict a disproportional increase in the exercise of
market power with demand increase - therefore our linear approximation in the Cournot model
represents a lower bound.
Long-term energy contracts are the main mechanism to reduce market power in spot markets
(Green 1999). The less output generators sell at spot prices, the lower their incentive to increase
spot prices by increasing their bids or by withholding output. We show that under this mechanism
the bias against returns to intermittent generation is also present as in the competitive case.
However in this case, the non-proportionate share of market power margins may not be in the
interest of an industry which is hoping to encourage renewable generation. We model endogenous
and exogenous long-term contracting, assuming that the strategic (conventional) generators will
sell a proportion of their output on long-term contracts. Then they will have to buy back some
energy at times of high wind output. If generators act as strategic buyers, then they will offer
lower prices, perhaps even below competitive prices. Similarly, strategic generators will push the
price above competitive prices at times of low wind output when they get to sell additional output.
However, the volume weighted price wind generators receive on their output is dominated by the
high volumes during high wind periods when prices are low. As a result intermittent generation
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will generally benefit less from the price increase frommarket power and in some cases the revenue
of intermittent generators might even be surpressed below the revenue they obtain in competitive
markets. A possible consequence is that investment will be focused on the technology that offers
the highest profitability, reducing the propensity to invest in renewables and/or increasing the
subsidy level required to achieve a target level of renewable investment.
Option contracts can provide more flexibility and therefore better match the requirements
of intermittent generation. In the first order we are interested in strategic behaviour and ignore
the risk hedging component of contracts. As a result, the only party that is directly affected by
option contracts are strategic generators. As we are not interested in the risk aversion aspects
of options we employ a simple option valuation technique than has been used in other studies
of capacity option pricing (Spinler et al, 2002) and wholesale electricity market option research
(Burger, 2004; Hjalmarsson 2003). We model contracts they sign with the demand side, both
with exogenousely set and endogenously determined contracting volume. These option contracts
can reduce but do not eliminate the discrimination of strategic behaviour against intermittent
technologies. Our model assumes a fixed, exogenously set, strike price. The results are not
sensitive to the strike price - but further research is required to assess the impact of multiple
types of option contracts with different strike prices.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the case of intermittent generation
returns under perfect competition. The decrease in returns due to intermittency is demonstrated
both graphically and analytically via a simple market model. In section 3, we change the market
structure to one of monopoly where the intermittent generators are fringe players in the market.
We allow for the possibility of forward contracting by the monopolist. The introduction of market
power increases the magnitude of the intermittency effect as compared to perfect competition.
In sections 4 and 5, we extend the analysis to a Cournot duopoly where the duopolists can
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Figure 1: Distribution of hourly wind power output (averaged over UK, Source Graham Sinden)
also conduct forward contracting and option contracting respectively. In section 6, we construct
numerical examples of these models using plausible parameters values and examine the sensitivity
of these assumptions. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Intermittent Generation under Perfect Competition
In an electricity market where intermittent generation, such as wind, comprises a small share of
total output, the variability of intermittent output should not be expected to have much effect on
the market price. As such, the average price for wind output should be the same as the average
market price. However, analysis of resource potentials suggest that intermittent generation could
become an increasingly significant share of the total market output (Hoogwijka e.a. 2004). In
this case, even in a competitive market, this result no longer holds - variability of output becomes
an issue. Figure 1 illustrates that the calculated output of wind turbines averaged over 50 UK
sites varies significantly due to the wind volatility. In the presence of increasing marginal costs of
conventional generators, during periods of high wind, the conventional generators, which provide
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Figure 2: Impact of wind output on market price - competitive case
the marginal generation, will be required to back down and move down the marginal cost curve,
resulting in a lower market price. Similarly, during periods of low wind, the conventional marginal
generation will be required to increase output, moving up the marginal cost curve or activating
higher cost generators, resulting in a higher market price. As a result, the periods of high wind
output receive a lower than average price and periods of low wind output receive a higher than
average price. The net effect is that the volume weighted average price received by wind is lower
than the average market price. Figure 2 illustrates the effect. The variation in the wind output
[-ε1,ε1] produces a variation in residual demand (DT −Qw,0) and thus a range of market prices
for a given marginal cost curve.
The result can be shown more formally using a simple market model. In this section we
assume competitive conventional generation, however, in later sections we examine the monopoly
and duopoly cases. In all cases we assume that intermittent generation is competitive and for
simplicity we will designate it as wind generation. We initially assume that all energy is traded
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in the spot market and subsequently expand the model to allow for trading of long-term energy
contracts by the conventional generators in the period preceeding the spot market. The following
table summarises all the symbols that will be used throughout this paper.
D0 Demand intercept Qw,0 Average wind output
b Demand slope εw Deviation from average wind output
DT Realised market demand εw˜(0, σ
2
w) in sections 2-4
εw~uniform[-ε1,ε1] in sections 5-6
Qi Conventional generation output MC Marginal costs conventional generator
competitive and monopoly i = g,
duopoly i = A,B
α+ βQ Intercept and slope of MC
p Spot price of electricity p∗ Expected average spot price
Li Forward contract volume of generator i Ni Option contract volume generator i
z Price of forward contracts r, e Option price and strike price
Consider a market where market price, p, is a linear function of the total market demand
for electricity, DT :
p = D0 − bDT (1)
Furthermore, assume that electricity is supplied by two different types of generators: conventional
generators (such as gas turbine or coal generators) whose collective output isQg, and intermittent
generators (which we will assume here is wind generation) whose output is assumed to have a
fixed and stochastic component Qw,0+ εw. We assume that E[εw] = 0 and V ar[εw] = σ2w. The
intermittent output is produced by a set of competitive generators that offers all available output
at their marginal costs of zero. They are subsequently rewarded at the price of the marginal
bid. This is the case in uniform price auctions that are implemented in all European power
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exchanges, zonal pricing (Nordpool) and nodal pricing (North East of US). Bilateral trades and
some balancing mechanisms (e.g. UK) price every contract at the bid price. Bidders anticipate
such behaviour and adjust their bid accordingly. For the case of uncertainty and symmetric firms
with varying costs Green (presentation CMI workshop November 2004) shows that uniform and
pay-as-bid auctions result in the same revenue. This result does not necessarily apply if some
firms own wind generation and other firms conventional generation assets.
In equilibrium demand matches supply:
DT = Qg +Qw,0 + εw, (2)
and using (1) gives:
p = D0 − b(Qg +Qw,0 + εw). (3)
We assume that a conventional generator has a quadratic cost function:
Cg(Qg) = αQg +
β
2
Q2g, (4)
and thus the marginal cost of the conventional generator is:
MCg = α+ βQg. (5)
Wind generation is assumed to have a zero marginal cost. The conventional generator is always
the marginal generator and sets the market prices. Combining (3) and (5) gives:
p = D0 − b(Qg +Qw,0 + εw) =MCg = α+ βQg, (6)
and equilibrium output and price are
Qg =
D0 − b(Qw,0 + εw)− α
b+ β
, p =
β(D0 − b(Qw,0 + εw)) + bα
b+ β
. (7)
The average equilibrium price in the competitive equilibrium, where E[εw] = 0, is therefore:
p∗c = E[p] =
β(D0 − bQw,0) + bα
b+ β
(8)
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The variability of intermittent generation, εw, affects both realized output quantities and price.
Therefore revenue received by both conventional and wind generators contains the term ε2w,
which does not average out in expectation. For the wind generator, net-profit (excluding fixed
costs) is:
E[πw] = E[p(Qw,0 + εw)] =
β(D0 − bQw,0) + bα
b+ β
Qw,0 −
bβ
b+ β
σ2w
= p∗cQw,0 −
bβ
b+ β
σ2w. (9)
Alternatively, dividing by Qw,0, we have the average price received on wind output, pw:
pw = p
∗
c −
β
b+ β
b
Qw,0
σ2w. (10)
Thus the average price received by wind on its output is composed of two parts. The first
component is the average market price. The second component is related to the variability of
wind output, which we will call the competitive intermittency factor. Given that b, β, σ2w > 0
the intermittency factor is clearly a negative value. With increasing slope of the marginal cost of
the conventional generator, β, the impact on the market price from a variation in wind output
is increasing and thus leads to a greater intermittency factor. Similarly, the less elastic demand
(larger b) the larger the impact of fluctuating wind output on the market price and thus greater
intermittency factor. Finally, with increasing variance, σ2w, the intermittency effect clearly
becomes stronger, while without wind fluctuations (σ2w = 0) the intermittency factor becomes
zero and the wind generators receive the market price pc.
The competitive intermittency effect reduces the average price on wind output below the
average market price. This is not a market failure, but represents the intrinsic lower value
of intermittent output relative to firm output. In reality every generation plant can fail, and
therefore every generation plant is subject to this intermittency effect. However, the likelihood
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of plant failure is lower than the likelihood of low wind output. Furthermore, the correlation
between individual conventional plant failures is lower than the correlation between low output of
intermittent generation of the same technology as climate is to some extent regionally correlated.
The next section assesses how market power creates additional price distortions that no longer
correspond to differences in the value to the system of intermittent generation.
3 Intermittent Generation under Monopoly
Now let us examine the case where the conventional generator no longer prices at marginal cost
but acts as a monopolist. A well known result is that the pricing function of the monopolist is
steeper than the underlying marginal cost function. This is illustrated in figure 3. The result is
that the effect of the wind intermittency is to increase the magnitude of the difference between
the average market price and the volume weighted wind price.
In modelling this effect we introduce some further flexibility by allowing for the monopolist
to conduct forward contracting. The effect of forward contracting is to reduce the incentive to
raise prices in the spot market. Following Newbery (1998), forward contracting can also be seen
as an entry-detering strategy. The monopolist sets the level of forward contracting such that
the exercise of market power in the spot market is limited and spot prices do not exceed the
price at which entry is profitable.
Let Lg be the contract volume by the conventional generator (monopolist) and z be the price
at which contracts are signed. These contracts are sold some time before the final spot market
trading. As before, we assume that the intermittent output is produced by a set of competitive
generators that offers all available output at their marginal costs of zero. They are subsequently
rewarded at the marginal system price (uniform price auction). In the spot market, the profit
10
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Figure 3: Impact of wind output on market price - monopoly case
for the conventional generator is:
πg = p(Qg − Lg) + zLg −C(Qg) = (D0 − bDT )(Qg − Lg) + zLg − αQg −
β
2
Q2g
= (D0 − b(Qg +Qw,0 + εw))(Qg − Lg) + zLg − αQg −
β
2
Q2g. (11)
The first order condition for the choice Qg is:
(D0 − b(Qg +Qw,0 + εw))− b(Qg − Lg)− α− βQg = 0. (12)
From this:
Qg =
D0 − bQw,0 + bLg − α− bεw
2b+ β
, (13)
and from (3) the realized spot price is:
p =
(b+ β)(D0 − b(Qw,0 + εw))− b
2Lg + bα
2b+ β
. (14)
To deter entry, the monopolist chooses a contract level and output volume such that the expected
spot price E[p] does not exceed base load entry cost p∗m. With εw = 0 we have
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E[p] = p∗m =
(b+ β)(D0 − bQw,0)− b
2Lg + bα
2b+ β
(15)
Lg =
(b+ β)(D0 − bQw,0) + bα− (2b+ β)p
∗
m
b2
. (16)
This is a contract level that a monopolist will choose with an expectation of setting an average
market price of p∗m.
From (14 ) and (15) the realized spot price can be expressed as:
p = p∗m −
b(b+ β)εw
2b+ β
. (17)
Examining the expected profit for the wind generator we have:
E[πw] = E[p(Qw,0 + εw)] = E[(p
∗
m −
b(b+ β)εw
2b+ β
)(Qw,0 + εw)]
= p∗mQw,0 −
b(b+ β)
2b+ β
σ2w, (18)
and, similarly as with the competitive case above, we can determine the average price received
on wind output, pw:
pw = p
∗
m −
(
β
b+ β
+
b2
(2b+ β) (b+ β)
)
b
Qw,0
σ2w. (19)
Comparing (19) with the competitive case (10) shows that in the monopoly market structure
a strategic intermittency factor is added to the competitive intermittency factor. However, the
monopoly will also increase the average electricity price, (p∗m > p
∗
c), which compensates for
some or possibly all the strategic intermittency factor. We will examine a number of numerical
examples after looking at the duoploly cases below. Table 1 gives an example of where the
monopoly pricing results in the wind generator actually being worse off than in the competitive
case despite there being a higher average market price. The assumptions, which include 95%
contracting by the monopoly and 0.1 demand elasticity, are at one end of the range of parameter
assumptions we will look at in section 6 but are certainly not unreasonable.
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Competition Monopoly
Average Market Price 35.45 46.52
Competitive Intermittency Factor 3.33 3.33
Strategic Intermittency Factor 0 16.66
Wind Weighted Average Price 32.12 26.52
Table 1: Impact of intermittency on average wind prices.
1
4 Intermittent Generation under a Duopoly with Forward Con-
tracting
In practice, most electricity markets are neither perfectly competitive or perfect monopolies. A
more common situation is to have the market dominated by a handful of participants. An
oligopoly market structure is therefore perhaps the most appropriate assumption in analysing
modern electricity markets. In this section we extend the above analysis to modelling oligopoly
situations. As with the monoploy analysis we will include forward contracting and in the next
section will consider option contracting. Allaz and Vila (1993) first analyzed the effect of forward
contracting on Cournot oligopoly. Oligopolists increase their individual market share and profits
by foward contracting, and therefore sell some of their output on forward contracts. However,
forward contracts reduce the exercise of market power in the spot market and therefore reduce
total profits. Therefore oligopolists would be better off to collude by not forward contracting but
only monopolies can legally do so.
We assume there are two conventional generators i = A,B with output Qi, and one inter-
mittent (wind) generator (W). Output of the competitive conventional generator is replaced
by output from the oligopolists in equations (2) and (3). In order to ease comparison between
1Parameter values: p = 400−10DT ,MCg = 10+Qg,30% wind share with uniform distribution of 100% around
average and wind output, and 95% contracting level.
13
the duopoly and monopoly cases we assume that the marginal costs of the duopolists increase
with output at twice the rate as compared to the monopolist. This ensures that the aggregate
industry has the same marginal cost curve:
Ci(Qi) = αQi + βQ
2
i . (20)
The game between generators proceeds in two stages. In the first stage the two conventional
generators can sign long-term contracts with the demand side. Let Li be the contract volume
of generator i = A,B at contract price z. As we do not model risk aversion, long-term contracts
only serve as a strategic instrument. Therefore we do not need to model long-term contracts of
the competitive wind generation.
We analyse the model by working backwards. We first consider the stage-two spot market
behaviour contingent on the forward contracting volume. Then we look at contract decisions in
stage one given that all parties expect the predicted stage two behaviour.
4.1 The Spot Market
Suppose that both duopoly generators have signed contracts for amounts (LA, LB) in stage one.
Generator A’s profit in stage two are:
πA = p(QA − LA) + zLA − αQA − βQ
2
A. (21)
Substituting p from (3) with Qq = QA +QB gives:
πA = [D0 − b(QA +QB +Qw,0 + εw)](QA − LA) + zLA − αQA − βQ
2
A. (22)
The profit maximising output choice of A follows from setting the derivative of (22) with respect
to QA to zero:
QA =
bLA +D0 − b(QB +QW,0 + εw)]− α
2b+ 2β
. (23)
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Using the symmetric expression for QB and substituting in (23) gives:
QA =
(2b+ 2β)bLA − b
2LB + (b+ 2β)[(D0 − b(QW,0 + εw)− α)]
(2β + 3b)(2β + b)
. (24)
The quantity sold in the spot market by generator A is an increasing function of the contracting
level LA and decreasing function of LB. Substituting (24) and its symmetric expression for QB
into (3) with Qq = QA +QB gives:
p =
(2β + b) (D0 − b (QW,0 + εw + LA +LB)) + 2b (α+ β(LA + LB))
2β + 3b
(25)
=
(2β + b) (D0 − b(QW,0 + εw)) + 2bα− b
2(LA + LB)
2β + 3b
. (26)
The first line of (25) shows that forward contracting only results in a small change to the usual
Cournot duopoly equation. Forward contracting volumes are directly deducted from the total
available market share (Li in first part of numerator) and the smaller market results in lower
prices. But forward contracting volumes also increase the base level of marginal cost and therefore
optimal price for additional output (Li in second part of numerator). The effect of the smaller
remaining market dominates the increase marginal cost and the second line (26) shows that total
market price is strictly decreasing in contracting volume.
The expected market price in the oligopoly market, p∗o, follows from setting εw = 0 in (26):
p∗o =
(2β + b)[(D0 − bQW,0)] + 2bα− b
2(LA + LB)
2β + 3b
, (27)
and we can rewrite the realized market prices as:
p = p∗o −
b(2β + b)
2β + 3b
εw. (28)
4.2 The Contract Market
In period one the contracts are signed. The counterparty to the strategic generators is assumed
to behave competitively and will therefore sign the contracts at the expected spot price. That is
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z = p∗o. Therefore, from (22) and (28) the Cournot generator expects the following profits:
E[πA] = E[p(QA − LA) + p
∗
oLA − αQA − βQ
2
A]
= E[(p− α− βQA)QA] (29)
Taking the derivative with respect to the contracting choice LA and substituting from the the
symmetric expression for LB gives the equilibrium contract levels:
Li =
b(D0 − bQW,0 − α)
5b2 + 10bβ + 4β2
, (30)
By substituting this into (27), the corresponding expected price is:
z = p∗o =

 −3b
4Qw,0 + 8β
3D0 + 4b2β(5D0 + 5α− 6βQw,0)
−4bβ2(−6D0 − 2α+ 2βQW,0) + b
3(3D0 − 4β(−6α+ 5Qw,0))


(3b+ 2β)(5b2 + 10bβ + 4β2)
, (31)
and average output quantities:
E[QA] = E[QB] =

 −6b
3qw,0 + 4β
2(D0 − α) + 2bβ(5D0 − 5α− 2βQw,0)
−b2(6D0 − 6α+ 10βQW,0)


(3b+ 2β)(5b2 + 10bβ + 4β2)
.
These analytic results will be used in later numerical examples to illustrate the impact of different
contracting arrangements.
4.3 Wind generator
The expected profit of the wind generators follows from substituting p from (28) into the net-
profit equation:
E[πw] = E[p(Qw,0 + εw)] = E[(p
∗
o −
b(2β + b)εw
(2β + 3b)
)(Qw,0 + εw)]
= p∗oQw,0 −
b(2β + b)
(2β + 3b)
σ2w, (32)
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and as with the competitive and monopoly cases the net-profit equation is used to calculate the
average price received on wind output:
pw = p
∗
o −
(
β
b+ β
+
b2
(3b+ 2β) (b+ β)
)
b
Qw,0
σ2w. (33)
As in the monopoly case the price is not only reduced by the competitive intermittency factor
but also by the strategic intermittency factor (second component in the bracket). However, the
strategic intermittency factor is smaller than in the monopoly case, because the the equilibrium
price curve (as a function of net-demand) is less step in the duopoly case than it is in the
monopoly case. However, not only the intermittency factor, but also the average price varies
between the scenarios. A numerical comparison of the net effect is presented in section 6. Note
that the competitive intermittency and strategic intermittency factor are (in our linear model)
not a function of the equilibrium price and therefore independent of forward contracting levels.
5 Intermittent Generation under a Duopoly with Option Con-
tracting
We now complete the analysis by considering the case of option contracting rather than forward
contracting.2 For simplicity we assume that conventional generators can sell options which are
sold to competitive buyers and therefore priced competitively and where the strike price is set
exogenously. For the purposes of this analysis we use a very simple option pricing technique that
is based on an expected value calculated via the weighted probability of contigent states. As
compared to more sophisticated option valuing techniques (e.g. Black Scholes) we are making a
number of assumptions which include no risk aversion and zero interest rates. However, as we
are only concerned with the strategic aspects of contracting this simplified approach is consistent
2For another perspective on the use of financial options, particularly as to how they compare with forward
contracting in reducing market power under a Cournot setting, see Willems (2004).
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with the aims of this paper.
With the inclusion of options, there are three relevant possible states of the world in the
spot market for period two: (1) those states in which the options are all exercised (2) those states
in which the options are not exercised and (3) those states in which a fraction of the options
are exercised as buyers are indifferent between exercising their options or not exercising them
(i.e. the spot price equals the strike price). In the appendix we determine the optimal quantities
and corresponding market spot prices for each of these states and then derive the optimal option
contracting level in period one. As it turns out, the competitive intermittency and strategic
intermittency factors for the states (1) and (2) reduce to the case of forward and zero forward
contracting discussed in section 4.2 (see equation 33). For state (3), the intermittency factor is
zero as there is no variation in the price level for the variations of wind output in this range. The
aggregate intermittency factor is a weighted average of these three cases. Numerical examples
are presented in the next sections.
6 Numerical Examples
To examine the signficance of the strategic intermittency factor we present some numerical
examples of the above models using plausible parameter values. We assume an inverse demand
function of p = 400− 10DT which, along with the other assumptions, translates into a demand
elasticity of approximately 0.1. For short-term electricity demand response this is a still a rather
high elasticity level therefore we are likely to understate the effect. We assume a marginal cost
function of the conventional generators as MCg = 10+Qg. The absolute price is of little concern
as we are interested in the relative intermittency factor and market power margin. Average wind
output is set at Qw,0 = 11, which equals approximately 30% of realised demand. Total wind
output is uniformly distributed around the average output [0-22]. The strike price for the option
18
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Figure 4: Average price and volume weighted price for wind - no contracting
contracting is set at average competitive market price of 35.5. We examine below the sensitivity
of results tosome of these assumptions.
Figure 4 presents the simplest case of the effect of market power under the monopoly and
duopoly market structures with no contracting by the conventational generator(s). The Figure
decomposes the price into the price received under perfect competition and the additional margin
due to market power. As discussed earlier, even in the absence of market power, the conventional
generator(s) receives a higher average price on output than the wind generators. This is the
result of the competitive intermittency factor and is small but significant. With the introduction
of market power not only does the average price level increase but so does the difference in returns
to conventional and wind output due to the strategic intermittency factor. Without contracting,
spot prices always exceed marginal cost prices and therefore wind always benefits from market
power, albiet to a lesser degree than conventional generation. Figure 4 illustrates that without
contracting generators could exercise excessive amounts of market power. To obtain realistic
results we have to reflect the impact of forward contracting.
In Figure 5 the results of introducing endogenous contracting by the conventional generators
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51%)
are presented. In equilibrium each duopolist will sell about 45% of output on forward contracts.
In the scenario with option contracting approximately 51% of output is contracted. A monopolist
will not voluntarily forward contract because he only incurs the ‘cost’ of restraining his market
power but not the benefit of capturing competitors’ market share. To facilitate comparison
between the cases we exogenously set the forward contracting level of the monopolist at 45%.
For both the monopoly and oligopoly forward contracting cases the strategic intermittency
factor is not a function of the forward contracting level (see equations 19 and 33). However,
forward contracting reduces the absolute price level. Therefore the relative importance of the
strategic intermittency factor increases compared to the no contracting case.
The market power margins in Figure 5 are still far higher than typically observed. This is
partly because in practice forward contracting volumes are typically far higher than the 45-50%
levels that emerge from the model here. Allaz and Villa (1993) explain the higher contracting
volumes by repeated contracting stages. In their model, moving towards infinite contracting
stages results in strategic generators forward contracting all output with prices converging to-
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wards competitive levels. Other possible factors resulting in higher contracting volumes include
risk aversion or requirements by competition authorities (e.g. virtual power plant auctions). We
therefore model a case where we exogenously set contracting volumes at 90% of expected output
by conventional generators. Figure 6 shows that large volumes of forward contracting bring the
prices closer to competitive levels and to market power mark-ups in the duopoly case that seem
realistic. With 90% forward contracting the strategic intermittency factor almost eliminates the
market power margin for the wind generator in the duopoly market.. Table 1 showed that in the
case with 95% foward contracting the strategic intermittency factor is bigger than the duopoly
mark-up and therefore market power even reduces the revenue for wind generation relative to the
competitive case. This latter example is a case of an absolute bias against intermittent genera-
tion where wind is actually worse off under a market power structure than under a competitive
market structure. Our numerical cases in this section have illustrated only a relative bias against
intermittent generation in which wind is still better off under a market power environment but to
relatively less degree than conventional generation. In our base case, a contracting level of 92.3%
is the threshold level. For any contracting level above 92.3% wind is absolutely worse off. This
can be seen clearly at 100% contracting where the average market price equals the competitive
price but to which the magnitude of the strategic intermittency factor remains the same and
thus the wind price is grossly below the competitive price.
In the option contracting case the strike price was again set in the mid range of the observed
prices at 35 £/MWh. The result with option contracts differs from the result with forward
contracts, because generators have no incentive to push the spot price below competitive prices
at times when they produce less energy then they contracted for. This has two implications. First,
the average price level stays higher as can be observed by comparing the average price paid to
conventional generators in forward and option contracting case. Secondly, the intermittency
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Figure 6: Average price and volume weighted price for wind - 90% contracting
discount is lower, because at times with high wind output market power does not distort prices
to be below marginal costs of conventional generators. As a result option contracting results in
less discrimination against intermittent generation than forward contracting. The sensitivity of
the results to different choices of strike prices is presented in Figure 7. With strike prices below
7 the options are always called and we revert to the forward contracting case. As the strike price
is increased (e.g. 25 £/MWh) more of the downward price deviations are avoided and volume
weighted wind price increases by more than the average price. With increasing strike price the
options are called less frequently and average weighted wind prices increases. With strike above
150 the options are never called and the result corresponds to the no forward contracting case.
For all strike prices the average price levels paid to conventional generation exceed the price
in the forward contracting case. This is partially caused by a model simplification. We only
model one type of option contract with a fixed strike price. As marginal costs are increasing
the strike price always exceeds marginal costs over part of the output range. And therefore the
option contracting with only one strike price will never converge to the competitive equilibrium
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Figure 7: Average price and volume weighted price for wind - different option strike prices
even with 100% option contracting. In contrast, if for each output level an option contract with
strike price at the marginal costs of this output level is signed, then 100% option contracting
results in a competitive outcome.
This result can be interpreted as a constraint on the model - or as a policy indication that
simple option contracts will not suffice to eliminate distortions from market power.
Finally we examine the sensitivity of the results to other assumptions in the model. In
Figure 8 the base case is the duopoly with 90% forward contracting. In the second set of
columns the variation in wind output is reduced from 100% of the average to 75% of average. As
a result the competitive and strategic intermittency factors are reduced but remain significant.
We also tripled the spot market demand elasticity to 0.3. The effect is a reduction of market
power and intermittency factor. Finally a reduction of the share of wind output from an average
of 30% to 15% is examined. Once again the effect is a reduction of the competitive and strategic
intermittency factors but they still remain significant.
The effect described in this paper can impact on all technologies with output that (1) cannot
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Figure 8: Average price and volume weighted price for wind - other scenarios
be predicted on a long term horizon (for contracting), (2) have plant output deviations that are
correlated, and (3) the technology has a sufficiently large market share. Wind power satisfies
this requirement. Not affected are solar photovoltaics because of its currently small market share
and tidal energy because output can be predicted long-term and can therefore be covered with
long-term contracts.
7 Conclusions
Transmission constraints separate electricity markets - and therefore create market power for
local generators. It is difficult to create sufficient local competition and costly to eliminate all
transmission constraints. Therefore a recurring response is that a limited amount of market
power is unavoidable. A limited amount of market power is sometimes perceived as acceptable
as it creates revenues for generators to cover some of the fixed costs. It is assumed that all market
participants benefit equally from the increased prices. However, this assumption is not satisfied if
different production technologies are used. We assess the case of a generation mix of conventional
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generation and intermittent generation with exogenously varying production levels. If all output
is sold in the spot market, then intermittent generation benefits less from market power than
conventional generation. If forward contracts or option contracts are signed, then market power
might be reduced but the bias against returns to intermittent generators persists. Thus allowing
some level of market power as a means of encouraging investment in new generation may result
in a bias against intermittent technologies or increase the costs of strategic deployment to achieve
renewable quotas. Likewise market power monitoring, if it only focuses on retaining the average
spot price or the price paid by consumers below a certain level, is likely to ignore the distortions
market power can still create between different technologies. This paper suggests that option
contracts might eliminate some of the distortions as strategic generators selling output on option
contracts will not push the spot price below competitive levels as they would when buying back
electricity at times of excess supply from intermittent generation. However, our model shows
that high levels of option contracts are required. The model also shows, that only one set of
simple option contracts with a uniform strike price are only of limited value. More complex
contracting structures are subject to future research.
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8 Appendix
The determination of optimal contracting for the three possible states at the expiry
of the option
For simplicity we assume that conventional generators can sell options which are priced
competitively and where the strike price is set exogenously. For the following analysis we will
also assume that the volatility of wind, εw, follows a uniform distribution on [−εm,+εm]. The
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probability density function (pdf) of this wind disturbance term is therefore:
pdf(ε) =


1
2εm
for εǫ[−εm,+εm]
0 otherwise

 (34)
As with the forward contracting case, the game between two generators proceeds in two periods.
In the first period generators can sell option contracts to someone (e.g. consumers, retailers).
The amount they sell depends on the expectation of profits in the spot market in period two.
We define the price at which the option is sold as r. Buying the option allows a consumer to
buy electricity at strike price e, therefore the consumer will exercise the option whenever the
spot price exceeds e. Strategic generator i = A,B, sells the volume Ni of options. As before we
analyse the model by working backwards, considering state two spot market behaviour and then
analyse the equilibrium volume of options sold in stage one.
The Spot Market
Consider the three different possible states of the world in the spot market in period two: (1)
those states in which the options are all exercised (2) those states in which the options are never
exercised and (3) those states in which a fraction of the options are exercised, as consumers are
indifferent between exercising their option or not exercising it (i.e. the spot price equals the strike
price). We determine the optimal quantities of contracting for each of these states (dependent
on option contracting level) and then derive the optimal option contracting in period one.
State 1: Option Exercised
In this state the realized profit by the conventional generator is:
πHA = p
H(QHA −NA) + rNA + eNA − αQ
H
A − βQ
2H
A , (35)
i.e. conditional on the option being exercised, the profit is equal to the revenue from uncontracted
sales into spot market plus the premium from selling N options plus revenue on the sale of N
units of electricity on called options minus the cost of electricity produced. The profit, quantity,
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and price variables are superscripted with H which signifies the state of ’High’ prices when the
options are exercised.
In a very similar manner to the forward contracting case above, by substituting p from (3)
with Qq = Q
H
A +Q
H
B gives:
πHA = [D0 − b(Q
H
A +Q
H
B +QW,0 + εw)](Q
H
A −NA) + rNA + eNA − αQ
H
A − βQ
2H
A . (36)
Taking the first order condition yields with respect to QHA yields:
QHA =
bNA +D0 − b(Q
H
B +Q
H
W,0 + εw)]− α
2b+ 2β
, (37)
Using the symmetric equation for QHB and subsituting in (42) gives:
QHA =
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − α− bεw) + (2b+ 2β)bNA − b
2NB
(2β + 3b)(2β + b)
, (38)
and the corresponding price:
pH =
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − bεw) + 2αb− b
2(NA +NB)
(2β + 3b)
. (39)
State 2: Option Not Exercised
In those states of the world in which the option is not exercised the conventional generator
will have a profit of:
πLA = p
LQLA + rNA − αQ
L
A − βQ
2H
A .
By proceeding with a similar substitution for price and using the symmetric first order conditions
we obtain:
QLA =
(D0 − bQW,0 − α− bεw)
(2β + 3b)
, (40)
pL =
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − bεw) + 2αb
(2β + 3b)
. (41)
State 3: Option Partially Exercised
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There is also an intermediate case where some but not all options are exercised. The feature
of this set of states, associated with a range of εw, is that the price is always equal to the exercise
price. This is in fact why partial exercise is rational, and not an either/or decision, as a holder of
the options is indifferent between exercising the options (and making zero profit if the electricity
is sold back into the spot market) or letting the options expire. Thus p = e and substituting p
from (3) with Qq = Q
H
A +Q
H
B gives:
pM = D0 − b(Q
M
A +Q
M
B +Qw,0 + εw).
The superscript M represent this ’middle’ state. With p = e and adding the assumption of
symmetry QMA = Q
M
B gives:
e = D0 − b(Q
M
A +Q
M
A +Qw,0 + εw),
QMA =
D0 − bQw,0 − bεw − e
2b
. (42)
Thus, we have a determined QMA for any given εw in this intermediate case.
Valuing the Option in Stage One
In equilibrium we assume that the value of the option is equal to the expected value from
the three possible classes states. Assuming a simple two period case with no interest rates, the
value of the call option may be calculated as the expected value over all possible realisations of
εw. Using (34) gives:
r =
∫ εd
−εm
1
2εm
(pH − e)dε+
∫ εu
εd
1
2εm
(e− e)dε+
∫ εm
εu
1
2εm
0dε
=
∫ εd
−εm
1
2εm
(pH − e)dε, (43)
where εd is the highest level of wind up to which all the options are exercised and εu is the lowest
level of wind down to which no option is exercised. Equation (43) can be interpreted such that
the value of the option is derived from the excess of price over the strike price in those states
when wind is sufficiently low.
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From (39) we obtain:
pH =
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − bεw) + 2αb− b
2(NA +NB)
(2β + 3b)
, (44)
and for the special case of pH = e, when εw = εd (ie. we are just at the point where all the
options are exercised), we have:
e =
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − bεd) + 2αb− b
2(NA +NB)
(2β + 3b)
. (45)
Recall that e is exogenous, so (45) provides a relationship between NA, NB and εd.
Substituting (44) and (45) in (43) yields:
r =
∫ εd
−εm
1
2εm
(
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − bεw) + 2αb− b
2(NA +NB)
(2β + 3b)
−
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − bεd) + 2αb− b
2(NA +NB)
(2β + 3b)
)dε
=
∫ εd
−εm
1
2εm
(
−b(2β + b)(εw − εd)
(2β + 3b)
)dεw
=
b(b+ 2β) (εm + εd)
2
4(2β + 3b)εm
(46)
Determining the Option Contracting Volume in Stage One
In period 1, the expected profit in period 2 is the probability weighted profits from each
possible state of the world in period 2:
E[πA] =
∫ εd
−εm
1
2εm
(pH(QHA −NA) + rNA + eNA − αQ
H
A ) +
∫ εu
εd
1
2εm
((e− α)QMA + rNA))
+
∫ εm
εu
1
2εm
(pLQLA + rNA − αQ
L
A) (47)
In evaluating this expression we can be assisted by considering the constraint that arises at the
exercise price:
e = pHεd =
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − bεd) + 2αb− b
2(NA +NB)
(2β + 3b)
= pLεu =
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0 − bεu) + 2αb
(2β + 3b)
(48)
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Two particular relationships from this that are useful are:
εu =
(b+ 2β)(D0 − bQW,0) + 2αb− (3b+ 2β)e
b(2β + b)
(49)
εd = εu −
b
b+ 2β
(NA +NB) (50)
By substituting (38) (39), (40), (41), (42), (46), (49) and (50) into (47) and solving for NA
and NB we get:
NA = NB =
b2D0 + 3b2e− b3Qw,0 − 4b2α+ 2bβD0 + 2bβe− 2b2βQw,0 − 4bβα+ b3ε1 + 2b2βεm
2(4b3 + 10b2β + 6bβ2 + β3)
.
Unfortunately the analytic expressions for pw is too long to be replicated here. However, it
is fairly easy to see that the intermittency and strategic intermittency factor for the states 1 and
2 reduce to the case of forward contracting discussed in section 4.2 (see equation 33). For state
3, the intermittency factor is zero as there is no variation in the price level with wind output.
The aggregate intermittency factor is a weighted average of these three cases and therefore lower
than the equivalent level of forward contracting.
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